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Abstract 
 
This paper will compare and contrast the personal characteristics among individuals who were 
born in Middle Eastern countries and have committed violent acts of terror in the name of Salafi 
Jihadism against Western countries. First, a review of the current literature on the pre-conditions 
for Salafi-jihadist radicalization and activism in general will be conducted. Next, the study will 
focus on those issues most salient to the Middle East. This research will serve as a precursor for 
further study on ways to build a profile on at risk individuals for Salafi jihadist radicalization, 
recruitment, and activism.  
 Keywords: Islam, Jihad, Radicalization, Recruitment, Salafi jihadism, Middle East  
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Characteristics of Salafi Jihadist Activists  
I. Introduction 
 The violence created by terrorism and political extremism has become ever more 
prevalent in the twentieth century and remains a serious threat to our future stability. Currently 
some of the strategies for combatting terrorism include targeted killings and responses to 
violence. Unfortunately these responsive policies do not eliminate the main cause of the 
movement and killing select leadership members only frees the position for another follower to 
take. The leadership group of a movement is important to identify but this is only one part of a 
multi-layered problem. Radicalization and recruitment are also a large part of the problem 
because they involve getting more individuals involved and supporting the movement. It is 
necessary to identify and isolate the common social, psychological, and societal characteristics 
and variables that surround individuals that have already engaged in violent attacks because they 
serve as a theme for the next generation of recruits. This information can be used to generate a 
profile of what not only recruits might look like, but also what risk factors lead to activism. The 
profile can then be used for future policy action to intervene in this radicalization process in 
hopes that it can stop the spread of the ideology. This argument relies on the fact that ideology 
can be a terrorist organization’s greatest weapon but also its biggest disadvantage when there is a 
lack of support. Ideology has the ability to unite a large number of individuals with differing 
backgrounds under one larger cause. However, if people no longer need or support the ideology, 
then the movement cannot continue.   	   This	  paper	  is	  a	  study	  of	  data	  gathered	  from	  open	  source	  information	  regarding	  important	  characteristics	  of	  salafi	  jihadists.	  	  The	  search	  for	  the	  information	  was	  guided	  by	  hypotheses	  about	  who	  is	  likely	  to	  drawn	  to	  salafi	  jihadism	  that	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  literature	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on	  the	  sources	  of	  salafi	  jihadist	  radicalization.	  	  The	  hypotheses	  guided	  the	  data	  collection,	  which	  was	  then	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  hypotheses. 
 This study will begin by explaining the history and goals behind the Salafi jihadist 
ideology to give an understanding of what it is that individuals are being recruited for. The goal 
of this study is to identify those social, psychological, and societal characteristics that have been 
common among previous activists. By doing so, it will suggest that there are common profile 
factors that could place a person more at risk for radicalization and potentially even recruitment. 
This study will be achieved through a thorough literature review and analysis of the available 
data as well as a quantitative analysis of one hundred previous Salafi jihadist activists that have 
engaged in terror attacks against the West.  
II. Literature Review 
 The literature review will consist of several key components that explain the background 
of Salafi jihadism as an ideology. The following sections will be discussed: Definitions, 
Development of Salafi Jihadism, Methods of Radicalization, and Common Characteristics. This 
section will provide a sort of timeline for the evolution of the ideology coupled with analysis on 
current member characteristics that will be contrasted with the quantitative analysis in the below 
sections.  
Definitions 
 In order to understand Salafi jihadism as an ideology, it is necessary to understand the 
path that it took to become what it is today. The Salafi ideology has roots as deep as several 
hundred years but it really came to the forefront in the twentieth century. This ideology is a path 
and a method that is used to search for religious truth and a desire to practice Islam exactly as the 
Prophet revealed it. There are several core concepts of Salafism that must be adhered to in order 
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to find religious truth. The first of these concepts is the tawid or belief that there can only be one 
God. Those following Salafism are required to have a strict adherence to this concept. Tawid 
includes three components and each of them is belief based. The first component is that the one 
God is the sole creator and sovereign of the universe (Wiktorowicz, 2006).  The second 
component is that God is supreme and entirely unique. This means that God does not resemble 
humans or any other creations and does not share the same characteristics or powers 
(Wiktorowicz, 2006). The Qur’an mentions God as the supreme legislator and this power cannot 
be given to or utilized by humans. This is extremely important to salafis and explains their 
rejection of secularism and the separation of church and state because nothing can have 
supremacy over divine governance. The third component is that God alone has the right to be 
worshipped and no one else. The Qur’an and Sunna outline rules that govern every aspect of 
human belief and behavior and therefore play a large role in every action (Wiktorowicz, 2006). 
According to a strict adherence to this belief, any deviant behavior that does not meet the criteria 
set forth in these two documents is considered a submission to something other than God. This 
component is essential to understanding why salafis feel that actions outside these parameters are 
impure.  
 The second concept is related to innovation in the faith and is called bida’. This term is 
given to any belief or action that is not directly in line with the Qur’an or the Prophet 
(Wiktorowicz, 2006). These actions and beliefs then appear to be a threat to tawid because they 
do not strictly adhere to the rules set forth by God. Followers believe that the Qur’an and the 
Sunna reveal the true nature of Islam and how it should be practiced. This means that any 
deviation of the path to God and the faith is then considered to be wrong.  
 The final concept that must be considered is the idea that there should not be a separation 
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of Muslim students into different schools. They believe that there is only one correct 
interpretation of Islam and that it should be taught universally to all Muslim students. The term 
to describe the other schools teaching different interpretations of Islam is taqlid. The best way to 
explain this concept is when individuals blindly follow their leader without considering the 
sources of Islam directly (Wiktorowicz, 2006). This reinforces the belief of tawid and that there 
is only one God and only this God should be worshipped. Typically individuals that are guilty of 
taqlid have closely followed one individual and due to their admiration, seldom question their 
teachings of the faith. This allows for misinterpretations to occur and a deviation from what is 
believed to be true Islam.  
 There are many Salafi jihadist organizations currently operating in the Middle East. A 
few of the more notable groups are Al Qaeda, Jabhat al Nusra in Syria, ISIL/ISIS of Greater 
Syria, Mujahidin Shura Council of Iraq, and Ansar al Sunna in Iraq. Each of these organizations 
has left their mark in the history of the Middle East as a Salafi jihadist terrorist organization. 
These groups were established for varying reasons but all still subscribe to similar ideological 
principles. Their recruitment methods are slightly different as well because of the area they 
occupy and the resources that they have available. To show just how far these groups are capable 
of spreading their ideology, Appendix A shows a map of the outreach of Al Qaeda (The 
Economist, 2013). Even in 2013, there were a significant number of Salafi jihadist groups 
present in the Middle East and North Africa. These groups included Al Qaeda Core (AQC), 
Jabhat al Nusra (JAN), Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), and Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), Al Shabab, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These groups 
were able to establish networks and ground forces in sixteen different countries between the 
Middle East and North Africa and maintained their recruitment in each of these areas as well.  
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Development of Salafi Jihadism 
 In 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Salafi jihadis travelled to 
Afghanistan to fight the Soviets because they believed the fight was a struggle between 
Communists and Muslims. These fighters were called Afghan Arabs and they believed the best 
method of violence was jihad, and they used this method not only to protect their lives, but also 
to protect their beliefs. In 1988, the Soviets began to leave Afghanistan, so the Afghan Arabs felt 
that they had defeated them with God’s help. A chief proponent of this combination was 
Abdallah Azzam, who created the theory of global jihad. Azzam founded the Maktab al-Kidamat 
with the help of Usamah bin Laden during the Soviet invasion, which was an office for recruiting 
Arabs to fight in Afghanistan (Stemmann, 2006). He believed that oppression of Muslims was 
not limited to just the Middle East and that believers should fight every instance of this 
oppression. He also believed that all Muslims had a religious obligation to fight and those who 
didn’t, supported the harmful practices and injustices against Muslims everywhere. He worked 
directly with Usamah bin Laden and the two worked to promote the global jihad ideology. 
Following Sayyid Qutb’s work, they believed that the use of jihad was not only a moral 
obligation for all Muslims, but also the sixth pillar of the Islamic faith (Stemmann, 2006). 
 During the 1990s, the Salafi ideology was split into two different sections, reformists or 
academic Salafism, and fighting or jihadi Salafism (Stemmann, 2006). The academic Salafism 
was typically the work of spreading the ideology and growing the movement. The jihadi oriented 
Salafism involved the termination of the individuals that were causing the injustices against 
Muslims and had a strong emphasis on violence. At this time, the Gulf War prompted Saudi 
Arabia to allow U.S. troops onto their soil in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
(Stemmann, 2006). While the intentions were noble, it caused an internal imbalance in Saudi 
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Arabia and helped to radicalize a good majority of Wahhabi followers. This also helped to spread 
the Salafi jihadist ideology and the idea of global jihad to end the oppression of Muslims 
everywhere.  
 One of the most important figures in the development of the Salafi jihadist ideology was 
Sayyid Qutb.  In order to understand his significance, it is necessary to look at his past 
experiences and influences. Qutb came from a poor family in the Nile Valley but was still able to 
obtain both a Western education and an Islamic education and upbringing (Ungureanu, 2010) 
(Stemmann, 2006). While he was growing up, he maintained an optimistic outlook for the ability 
to reconcile Western ideas and Islamic ideals. During this time, he supported a lot of different 
Western ideals such as science, technology, and rationalism; however, he did not believe that 
these concepts should ever cross Allah (Ungureanu, 2010). His appreciation of Western 
civilization was completely altered when he traveled to the United States in 1948 as a member of 
the Ministry of Education in Egypt (Ungureanu, 2010). His time in the United States made him 
realize that Americans were very out of touch with their faith and values and he believed that 
they did not act appropriately. This caused him to be very angry towards Western civilization 
and he feared its influence on the Muslim community as a whole.  
 When he returned to Egypt in 1951, he renounced his position with the Ministry of 
Education and joined the Muslim Brotherhood. It is at this time that he argues, “I was born in 
1951” (Ungureanu, 2010). Qutb worked his way through the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and became an integral part of its leadership and advisory boards. He however resigned from this 
position in 1952 because the group refused to establish an Islamic state (Ungureanu, 2010). In 
1954, the Muslim Brotherhood was officially banned and a member of the group attempted to 
assassinate President Gamal Abd’el Nasser (Ungureanu, 2010). After this time, a lot of members 
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became imprisoned, including Qutb. During his time in prison, he began writing a lot and was 
actually able to get some of his work published. The most significant piece of his writing related 
to the Salafi jihadist ideology was entitled Ma'alimfl'l-Tari, which translates to “Milestones on 
the road” (Ungureanu, 2010). This writing was a sort of call to arms in that, “Qutb argues that all 
contemporary societies returned to state of jahiliyya or pre-Islamic ignorance, in which authority 
and primacy of God have been replaced by other sources of authority, justifying this way the 
launch of jihad” (Ungureanu, 2010). He used the Salafist interpretation of the Koran as a sort of 
playbook for revolution and used jihad as the method of enforcement. He argued that his 
experience in America allowed him to see that Western civilizations were the true source of evil 
and that they must be destroyed in order for the true Islam to reign. His writing served as a 
resource for individuals still questioning their faith and wanting to understand Islam’s true 
purpose.   
Methods of Radicalization 
 According to Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the President of the RAND 
Corporation, there is a clear distinction between radicalization and recruitment. “Radicalization 
comprises internalizing a set of beliefs, a militant mindset that embraces violent jihad as the 
paramount test of one’s conviction. It is the mental prerequisite to recruitment” (Jenkins, 2007). 
This definition seems to suggest that the radicalization process is something that the individual 
controls and experiences on their own. In a way this statement is accurate because individual 
recruits need to process the ideology before seeking the training. If they do not understand the 
ideology itself and what it aims to achieve, they will not voluntarily engage in jihad. In addition 
to this, individuals must have the necessary characteristics, needs, and wants that are satisfied by 
the ideology. This means that the individual must have unique reasons for joining the group and 
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have an idea of what benefits they expect to gain from joining the organization. Jenkins phrases 
this radicalization process as a prerequisite to recruitment appropriately because one must have 
the desire to participate before they can train.  
 Recruitment on the other hand involves, “turning others or transforming oneself into a 
weapon of jihad. It means joining a terrorist organization or bonding with like-minded 
individuals to form an autonomous terrorist cell” (Jenkins, 2007). This definition suggests that 
recruitment is more of the formal joining process that allows one to hone in on their personal 
skills and determine what they can physically do to enforce the main principles of the ideology 
and achieve the goals of the group. The recruiters spread a message of honor, dignity, and 
religious duty that proves to be extremely attractive to potential radicals. For example, Al 
Qaeda’s brand offers an uncomplicated solution to individuals looking for adventure, 
camaraderie, a noble cause, a sense of direction and meaning, a better life, and an outlet for 
aggression (Jenkins, 2007).  
 The recruitment process involves a series of lessons that attempts to educate individuals 
in a way that fulfills their needs. If an individual is seeking purpose or meaning in their life, the 
lessons will be focused on being part of a larger picture and fighting for a common goal. 
Sometimes these lessons are catered to the individual recruit if they are showing promise or 
characteristics that would benefit the organization as a whole. This type of education can take 
place in a variety of places including colleges, universities, mosques, churches, temples, and 
even prisons (Forest, 2005). The recruitment process is a gradual one, it can take anywhere from 
a few months to several years to complete the training and education necessary to assure 
commitment from a new radical (Jenkins, 2007).  
 There are many methods used to increase the exposure of a particular group when it 
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comes to finding recruits. They use a variety of media to broadcast their messages and often 
times rely on word of mouth as well. The media forms most heavily relied on are social media 
sites such as Twitter and Facebook, online chat rooms, blogs, newspapers, brochures, and 
journals. With the increased use of technology, recruits can be found a lot easier and even 
provided additional informational materials in a matter of minutes.  
Common Characteristics 
 Terrorists are surprisingly very selective when it comes to choosing the right recruits to 
join their ranks in the organization. Despite the stereotype of terrorists being “wild-eyed 
fanatics,” organizations typically stay away from this set of characteristics because such 
individuals bring a level of unpredictability and unreliability (Forest, 2005). These characteristics 
could pose a serious risk to a group’s security and objectives as the recruit could challenge or 
expose the organization at any given time. For this reason, very outgoing individuals are kept 
under watch during the training process and are often weeded out because of their forward 
behavior.  
 Several characteristics appear to be relatively common among current salafi jihadists, 
recruits, and other followers. These characteristics can be broken up into the following 
categories: education, religion, family life, psychological characteristics, physical characteristics, 
and geographic location. Each of these categories has appeared in the current literature and some 
have been presented as common themes among personal characteristics.   
Education 
 Ideological indoctrination through education is not just limited to universities and 
colleges, but it is also done through what is referred to as madrasas and pesantren. These are 
Muslim boarding schools that specialize in training young men the teachings of the Koran. This 
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form of education teaches young individuals about the extremist ideology as well as provides 
methods of training in jihad. Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, 
Peter W. Singer, found that “there are as many as 45,000 such schools within Pakistan (the exact 
number has never been determined), ranging in size from a few students to several thousands” 
(Singer, 2001). In addition to this, Singer found that between 10-15 percent of Pakistan’s 
madrasas was affiliated with extremist religious/political groups (Singer, 2001). The curriculum 
for these institutions includes a study of Arabic and Islam that requires students to not only 
memorize the Koran, but also develop a commitment to a strict interpretation of what it means. 
The most extreme cases of this style of teaching include a commitment to fighting a jihad against 
the enemies of Islam (Forest, 2005).   
Religion 
 The Salafi jihadist ideology is structured on the belief that Islam is not being practiced, as 
it should, and that those who practice it improperly, should be corrected and punished. They 
create a sort of religious obligation and call to action for all true followers of the religion. They 
believe in an all or nothing structure that forces compliance or destruction in the form of jihad.  
 Recruitment can occur and be increased in mosques because of this religious testament to 
their ideology. Leaders of this movement are usually able to identify particularly devout Muslims 
in mosques and slowly advocate for their adherence to their strict interpretation of Islam. They 
look for those individuals that are not just going to Friday prayers, but those that are also praying 
five times a day, every day (Forest, 2005). The current members and recruiters will target these 
individuals to work to develop their motivation for violence to achieve change in the society as a 
whole. Not all mosques are used for indoctrination but there have been a significant number of 
them used to spread messages of hatred and violence.  
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Family Life 
 Recent observations have concluded that some terrorists come from “broken” homes 
where the father figure is either not present, estranged, or politically or economically impotent 
(Stahelski, 2004). While this has been characterized for a variety of terrorist groups, it is still 
particularly prevalent in individuals that have pursued membership in a salafi jihadist 
organization. The recruit is usually attracted to the charismatic leader because potentially this is 
their first instance of encouragement. These recruits are drawn to this social experience because 
it has been missing from their personal life and they feel that they need and deserve this social 
affiliation and encouragement (Stahelski, 2004). Not only can this be seen as a membership 
benefit, it also appears as a necessity for success and fulfillment, especially recruits that are 
lacking a strong family structure.  
 It has been seen that individuals that join such groups often have trouble fitting in and 
forming consistent group identities outside of the home, school, or workplace (Stahelski, 2004). 
Due to this social ineptitude, individuals are unable to integrate into the society and have a 
feeling of being alone or insignificant compared to those that do fit in. This is often called a 
feeling of anomie, where an individual feels that they are not part of a society and that they just 
do not belong. This feeling can cause individuals to seek easy routes of group formation that 
allow them to join despite certain social or economic standings.  
Psychological Characteristics 
 It is important to understand that these recruits are not forced into this lifestyle and are 
more than likely brought to the recruitment stage by personal choice. After being seduced by the 
charismatic leadership of a group, the recruit will begin to immediately obey the strict rules and 
guidelines set forth by that leader. This obedience is established from the very beginning as a 
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norm for group membership and benefits. Current members of the group help to guide the 
recruits by pressuring them to commit to the group’s mission and goals. They are reassured that 
the benefits of the group membership can only be attained through strict adherence to the guiding 
principles spelled out by the leadership. Excited recruits willingly adhere to this structure and 
become even more vulnerable to what psychologist Anthony Stahelski calls the “five-stage social 
psychological conditioning process” (Stahelski, 2004). This process is often used to explain the 
formation of a cult ideology but can also explain the adaption of a salafi jihadist ideology 
because it requires a strict adherence to leadership and a general cause. The process is 
summarized in Appendix B.  
 The first goal of this process is to eliminate the recruit’s original social and personal 
identity and then construct a new one based on the principals of the ideology. In this case, the 
leadership of the group will lead recruits to believe that their past version of themselves will not 
have to hold them back any longer and that they can be a new person with the group. They allow 
them to believe that they will be able to make real change and be part of something greater than 
what they could have ever been on their own. By doing this, they successfully pressure recruits 
to abandon their original ideology and personal opinions and adopt the group’s mission and 
goals. The recruit will begin to see the goals of the group as their own and take issues to be 
personally offensive if they are against that new ideology. This is where the willingness to kill 
comes in and the use of jihad to achieve goals becomes easier to understand.  
 Research has suggested that there is a fundamental importance of perceived deprivation 
among individuals that pursue violence as a means to generate change (Moghaddam, 2005). This 
deprivation can range from a personal feeling of being deprived because of an individual’s 
position within a group, to a much larger picture where a group is seen as subpar to another 
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group. The former is particularly significant in Salafi jihadist recruits because these individuals 
feel that they do not have an important role to play in their society. This feeling can be generated 
by a number of factors such as economic standing, social status, education, family structure, and 
authority. No matter what the reason may be, the individual feels like they are being deprived of 
a particular status in the society that they live in and are often angered by this isolation and 
comparison.  
 The latter form of deprivation on a group level is often explained by a disdain for the 
Western culture. This is something that was reinforced with Sayyid Qutb after his trip to the 
United States and his immediate attachment to the Muslim Brotherhood. When a group is seen as 
superior to another or more generally is just vastly different from another culture, the perceived 
inferior group will backlash. This backlash against Western culture has increased over time and 
essentially established an enemy. Targeted attacks on Western culture can be seen as a way to 
prevent the injustices against Islam as a religion and its followers. 
 Individuals that perceive that they have no ability to mobilize their concerns are also 
drawn to this ideology. When a recruit feels that their opinions and needs are not being 
addressed, they want to take it into their own hands and take what they believe is rightfully 
theirs. However, in the Middle East and North Africa, the democratic options for voicing one’s 
opinion are relatively miniscule (Moghaddam, 2005). Without the ability to have options for 
one’s own voice to be heard, mobility of that opinion, and substantial response, individuals feel 
that they are being cheated out of their fundamental rights. These qualities as well as the option 
of a participatory democracy are particularly lacking in areas such as Saudi Arabia. This country 
just happens to have a strong reputation for breeding some of the most influential terrorist 
networks currently active today (Moghaddam, 2005).  
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Physical Characteristics  
 Individuals that are either targeted or self educated on radicalization tend to be in their 
early 20s to early 30s in age range (Taylor & Louis, 2004). This age range is significant for not 
only physical purposes but ideological ones as well. At that early of an age, individuals typically 
have not yet adopted a firm ideology of what the world is and what their place is in it. When 
targeted at this age, they are more vulnerable to an influence because they are still trying to 
figure out their purpose and goals in life. When confronted during this critical time, recruits will 
often feel compelled to joining such groups that will help them understand their world around 
them. The group not only aids in providing support, but they also give the recruit achievable 
goals and structure, which they may not have already encountered. At this age, some recruits 
may just be graduating from school and during their education; they have increased their desire 
to challenge their environment and superiors. This may not necessarily be a negative assessment 
on their education but they may now have a better understanding on how society functions and 
they want to change this to fit their needs better. The desire to establish real social and political 
change is another area that individuals are targeted because the Salafi jihadist ideology provides 
a means for achieving this change, through jihad.  
 Young individuals are often future oriented and anxious to move on to the next chapter of 
their lives. The problem with this is, as noted above, they don’t typically have direction and 
guidance in which to further their exploration of the self. It has been noted that, “these ambitious 
young people are the prime candidates not only to engage in, but also to organize and lead 
terrorist activities” (Taylor & Louis, 2004).  
 In addition to this, recruits are often appealing at this age because they are fit to fight. It is 
necessary for the recruits to be able to physically withstand the rigorous activities that the group 
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engages in and not just get hurt or fall out. According to Austin T. Turk, Department of 
Sociology Professor at The University of California, “initiating and committing terrorist attacks 
is nearly always the work of radicalized younger persons with the intellectual and financial 
resources, and the ideological drive, to justify (at least to themselves) and enable adopting the 
violence option” (Turk, 2004).  
Geographic Location 
 This study focuses on individuals that are being recruited in Middle Eastern countries and 
therefore has a broad range of possible targets. Each organization has a different set of criteria 
that they use for recruiting individuals to their cause but none of them have appeared to denote 
specific types of locations that are targeted. However, one area that has appeared several times to 
produce Salafi Jihadist recruits is refugee camps. In these locations, youths are either capable of 
relocating due to their families resources or they are left in the camps to fend for themselves. 
Often times these individuals are forced into less than optimal areas with little resources at their 
disposal to live on. The emotional and physical ramifications of refugee life can take a serious 
toll on young individuals. When faced with this hopelessness young refugees, “may find 
attractive a terrorist organization’s offer of a very well defined collective identity that offers a 
clearly defined route for improving conditions for the individual and the group as a whole” 
(Taylor & Louis, 2004).  
 The radicalization and recruitment of followers of the Salafi jihadist ideology can take 
place anywhere that people gather, either online or in person. There is no set origin that has been 
seen as common for individuals that have joined such organizations. The ideology has no borders 
and is able to penetrate into most societies with ease in the Middle Eastern countries. If the 
access is not directly physical, recruits can still be contacted through the Internet. However, there 
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have been several educational facilities that have produced significant numbers of radicals 
pursuing this ideology. Some of these institutions include: Adbul Aziz University in Saudi 
Arabia, and the Abu Bakar Islamic University in Pakistan (Forest, 2005). Both of these 
educational facilities have earned a reputation for indoctrinating individuals as potential recruits 
for Islamic extremist organizations.  
III. Hypotheses and Model 
 The following research design is focused on a quantitative analysis of one hundred 
individuals that are from the Middle East and have engaged in violent acts against the West in 
the name of Salafi jihadism. The research will expose the similarities and differences in order to 
determine whether there are notable characteristics that are the same in individuals that have 
been radicalized and are following the jihad of the sword, actively participating in violent 
attacks. While this will not be a complete profile of characteristics, it will provide analysis on 
each of the similarities and the significance of these to the radicalization process. I expect to find 
several similarities among the categories of age, gender, religion, and education. . I will first 
explain my hypotheses and then move in to explain the model and design that I created.  
 I will investigate the following hypotheses:  
a. Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in 
the name of salafi jihadism are between the ages of 18-29.  
b. Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in 
the name of salafi jihadism are male. 
c. Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in 
the name of salafi jihadism have pursued higher education post high school. 
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d. Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in 
the name of salafi jihadism are self-radicalized and not influenced.  
e. Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in 
the name of salafi jihadism have social networks that include all of the following: 
salafi family, salafi friends, salafi mentor.  
 For this study, my dependent variable will be individuals that are born in the Middle East 
and commit terror attacks in the name of Salafi Jihadism against the West. My independent 
variables will fall into several categories including: Age, Gender, Education, Radicalization 
Method, Recruitment, Affiliation, and Social Networks. Education will be evaluated for higher 
level, post high school education. Recruitment methods will be used to determine self-motivated 
practices or characteristics that were sought out by recruiters. Social networks encompass the 
following identifiers: having salafi family members, having salafi friends, and having salafi 
mentors.  
IV. Research Design 
 In order to determine the similar characteristics and the probability of the above 
hypotheses, the research will consist of a review of the current scholarly literature as well as a 
quantitative analysis of 100 of the most recent terror attacks, focusing on the individuals 
involved and not the collective unit. Focusing on the individuals will allow for specific 
characteristics to be gathered but exposes the reality that not every individual can be studied with 
open source data because they are not named or known. The study will look at recent events and 
capture the following information for each attacker: Name, Age, Gender, Country of Origin, 
Current Location, Attacks on the Community/Friends/Family/Job-if yes, by who and why, 
Religious Affiliation & Degree of Practice, Family Structure, Family Religious Affiliation & 
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Degree of Practice, Salafi Family, Salafi Friends, Salafi Mentor, Education Type & Location, 
Attack Type, and Attack Location, Affiliation to Known Salafi Jihadist Group, Duration of 
Membership to Group Prior to the Attack, Recruiting Others.   
 Each of these variables will be measured differently according to the data that is 
available. The first independent variable of age will be assessed using a scale of 18-29, 30-39, 
40-49, 50-59, and 60-69. Gender will be identified by male, female, or other. Religious 
affiliation will be identified very broadly because of the limitations of open source information. 
The labels that will be used include: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Education will be given a 
rating to determine whether or not the individual obtained any form of higher education above 
the high school level. This will include all coursework and not just individuals that graduated 
with a higher degree. The responses for education will be recorded as either Yes, No, or N/A. 
Radicalization method and recruitment will be given a response of Influenced, Self Radicalized 
or N/A. Affiliation will be given a response of Yes, No, or N/A and will also have the option of 
naming the salafi jihadist organization that they are affiliated to. Social networks will be broken 
down into the following categories: salafi family, salafi friends, salafi mentors. Each of these 
will receive a response of Yes, No, or N/A.  
 For this part of the study, the data will be measured by a quantitative approach that 
generates numbers and figures to represent the presence and significance of personal 
characteristics and attributes. This is the best approach for this study because it allows for a 
count of the individual characteristics of individuals that were known to have caused attacks in 
the name of salafi jihadism. By using data from individuals that have already engaged in 
violence, it is possible to determine similarities and establish potential risk factors. This count is 
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necessary to build a profile of what characteristics could make an individual more likely to 
engage in an attack or become affiliated to a salafi jihadist terrorist organization.  
 This study will involve collecting data from various online resources and websites in 
order to create a pool of data. This data from the online research of 100 individuals will be 
manually entered into an excel database and a statistical analysis will be conducted upon 
completion. This method is the most appropriate because the current literature does not have this 
type of refined information available. There is currently no way of pooling all of these individual 
characteristics together automatically to form analysis from open source data. It is possible that 
some of this data is kept in different formats at a classified clearance level but for this study, that 
is unavailable. A variety of online resources will be used for this study varying from general 
search engines to federal government profile sites. The dataset consists of 100 individuals that 
were searched in a variety of online search engines. This data is organized in an excel database 
and graphic representations of the data were created to be used in this paper.  
 There are very clear limitations on the way this search is conducted because there is not a 
lot of information publically available. This is particularly true of some of the independent 
variables associated with this study. It is somewhat difficult to find personal information and 
social network information on lower level terrorists. Specifically finding information related to 
friends, family, and mentors is not always feasible. In addition to the variable information, there 
is not really a set list of individuals that committed violent acts in the name of salafi jihadism to 
base the analysis on. When conducting my search, I started with a list found online at 
markhumphrys.com of attacks conducted by individuals of Middle Eastern descent against 
Western countries. This list is a compilation and up-to-date listing of terror attacks conducted by 
individuals of Middle East descent against the West that have occurred during the following time 
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periods: Obama Administration (2008-2015), Bush Administration (2000-2008), Clinton 
Administration (1992-2000), Bush Senior Administration (1988-1992), Reagan Administration 
(1980-1988), and the first wave (1968-1980).  This list can be found in Appendix C. Each attack 
listed is linked to a Google search for the event that provides multiple hits in the form of news 
articles, Wikipedia pages, case studies, and government accounts of each incident. I searched 
each event on multiple sites to gather appropriate and accurate accounts of each individual 
searched. If information was inconsistent among websites, I did not use that individual for the 
data. Occasionally these events also alluded to related events that occurred during the same 
timeframe and those were searched and added as well.  
V. Summary of Research 
 The following information is organized by variable and category in which I researched. 
Each section explains the recording methods and the statistics that were gathered from the study 
as well as some brief conclusions that can be drawn from each data set. Most of the sections 
include graphic representations and figures to represent the data a little more clearly. The full 
dataset will not be attached to this paper because it is too large to fit.  
Age 
 There were only five individuals researched in this study that did not have an accurate 
age or date of birth available in the open source data. This means that ninety-five of the 
individuals that were profiled had accurate or approximate ages listed on two or more online 
resources. Of the data that was compiled, it was found that 48% of the individuals were between 
the ages of 18-29, 19% were between the ages of 30-39, 13% were between the ages of 40-49, 
17% were between the ages of 50-59, and 3% were between the ages of 50-59. This data 
includes individuals that were killed during their acts of violence, killed by other means, or are 
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still in custody. Due to the fact that some individuals are still in custody, it provides for a few 
outliers in the data and for higher ages to be represented. The graphic representation in Figure 1 
shows that there are a significant number of younger individuals involved with violence and 
terrorist attacks. The important part to notice is how evenly distributed the ages are in the 30-39, 
40-49, and 50-59 age ranges. This is something that was not expected prior to the research as the 
current literature assumes most recruits and affiliates are between the ages of 18-29. While most 
of the data supported this claim, it appears that there are still a significant number of individuals 
between 30-39 and 50-59.  
Figure 1: Age Range Percentages of Previous Salafi Jihadist Activists  
  
 There were forty-four individuals represented in the data that were between the ages of 
18-29 and this accounted for 48% of the total. Of those forty-four individuals twenty-five are 
deceased, eighteen are currently in custody, and there was one individual that had an unknown 
status. 
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 Between the ages of 30-39, there were eighteen individuals represented in this study and 
this accounted for 19% of the total. Of those eighteen, nine are deceased, seven are in custody, 
and two had an unknown status.  
 There were thirteen individuals between the ages of 40-49 that represented 13% of the 
data. Of those thirteen, five are deceased, five are in custody, and three individuals have an 
unknown status.  
 Between the ages of 50-59, there were sixteen individuals identified and this represents 
17% of the total. Of those sixteen individuals, four are deceased, nine are in custody, and three 
individuals have an unknown status.  
 There were nine individuals between the ages of 60-69 that represented 3% of the total 
data collected. Of those nine, one is deceased, four are currently in custody, and four individuals 
have an unknown current status.  
Gender 
 Of the one hundred individuals that were profiled, ninety-nine were male and only one 
was female. There is a very clear historical precedent of males engaging in terror attacks in the 
name of salafi jihadism. This is highlighted in the literature review at the beginning of the paper.  
Religion 
 When reviewing the religious affiliation of the profiled individuals, I did not label the 
specific forms of religion and left the categories very broad. This is because a lot of the data was 
unavailable for most of the individuals that I researched. Out of the one hundred, ninety-three of 
the individuals had a religious affiliation to Islam, one individual had a religious affiliation to 
Christianity, and six individuals were not identified in open source data. In Figure 2 it shows just 
how overwhelming the results were for a religious affiliation with Islam.  
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Figure 2: Religious Affiliation of Salafi Jihadist Activists 
 
Education 
 When evaluating the factor of higher education, this study focused on all coursework 
after high school. This takes into account religious or academic work that may or may not have 
led to a higher degree. It was difficult to track the completion of some of the degrees so it had to 
be labeled this way. When looking at the graphic representation of the data in Figure 3, 49% of 
the individuals profiled had some form of higher education. This percentage represents forty-
eight out of the one hundred total. Unfortunately, due to the limitations of the open source data 
there were 26 individuals that could not be determined whether or not they engaged in higher 
education or even high school or primary school. This amount is significant to not have available 
in the study and the results could have been very different if this were available. The research 
also found that 25% or 25 individuals did not pursue higher education after graduation of high 
school or primary school. While this data has limitations, it does support the current literature 
that shows recruits and affiliates as having higher education more frequently than not.  
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Figure 3: Frequency of Higher Education Among Salafi Jihadist Activists  
 
 
 
Radicalization Method 
 When looking at the radicalization methods among the profiled individuals, the results 
were filtered into three categories: Self Radicalized, Face to Face Influenced, and Not Available. 
The research found that thirty-six out of the one hundred individuals claimed to be self 
radicalized and sought the ideology. Out of the total amount, forty-four individuals were face to 
face influenced into the ideology. These results include influence from a mentor, family member, 
or friend. The study found that eighteen of the individuals did not have publicly available 
information on their form of radicalization.  
 When looking at the radicalization method I found it important to also look at the 
criminal record of each individual. There were too many different types of crimes committed by 
the profiled individuals to refine them any further than a positive or negative response. There 
were thirty-four individuals that had no criminal record, twenty-seven individuals that had an 
unknown criminal record, and thirty-six individuals that had a known criminal record. The 
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numbers between the positive and negative results of this study are very close and therefore are 
not a very good measure of criminal history. In addition to this, the number of unknown cases is 
very high as well and creates a great deal of error in the data. 
 Despite the close numbers and high margin for error in the criminal history study, when 
crossed with the radicalization method, things start to get interesting. Out of the thirty-four 
individuals that had no criminal record, sixteen of those were influenced and thirteen were self-
radicalized. With the high rates of radicalization in prisons that are noted in the above literature 
review, this is a negative result. Out of the thirty-six individuals that had a criminal record, 
eighteen of those were influenced and fourteen were self-radicalized. This result aligns more 
closely with the prison radicalization data from the literature review above. The graphic 
representation of this data in Figure 4 shows the disparities while including the error margins 
from information that was not available.  
Figure 4: Radicalization Method vs. Criminal History of Salafi Jihadist Activists  
 
 
Recruitment 
 When evaluating whether or not individuals were recruited into the salafi jihadist 
ideology or into a specific terrorist group, the responses were reported as Yes, No, or N/A. Out 
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of the one hundred individuals that were profiled, 41% were reported to have been sought out 
and recruited, 38% were not recruited, and 21% did not have recruitment information available. 
The results of this study indicate that a significant portion of individuals involved with the salafi 
jihadist ideology or a specific salafi jihadist terrorist group, were recruited. While the individuals 
that sought out the organization themselves are still important to mitigate, it is more difficult to 
identify and isolate them in the general public. Figure 5 below shows that the majority of 
individuals were recruited but also emphasizes that a significant number of individuals were not 
recruited as well.  
Figure 5: Recruitment of Salafi Jihadist Activists
  
 Since the majority in this study was recruited, this indicates a possibility of finding 
recruiters and potentially intervening the process from there instead of just seeking the 
individuals at risk. Another possibility that this poses is that once a profile of at risk individuals 
is developed, a population assessment or local profiling can be done in order to find groups of 
individuals with these characteristics. Once found, isolating a common friend or mentor will 
most likely allow for identification of the recruiter.  
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Affiliation 
 Another crucial part of this study was determining whether or not individuals were 
recruited into a known terrorist group. The responses for this factor were coded as either Yes, 
No, or N/A. Out of the one hundred that were profiled, sixty-one were affiliated with a specific 
salafi jihadist organization, twenty-four did not claim to be affiliated, and fourteen of the 
individuals did not have the information publically available. The graph in Figure 6 shows the 
breakdown of the data from the profile. The majority of the individuals profiled were not lone 
wolves and appeared to have a connection to a larger network. A larger network means more 
resources, training, and leadership that potentially allows for more successful attacks.  
Figure 6: Terrorist Group Affiliation of Salafi Jihadist Activists  
 
  
 In addition to finding out whether or not individuals were affiliated with a group, it was 
also important to try to determine which group they were affiliated with. Figure 7 shows the 
varying organizations that were found in this study. Al Qaeda (AQ) represented the majority 
measured at 84% of individuals that claimed to be affiliated. The different branches of AQ were 
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not mentioned here because a lot of the publications just indicated AQ and to include some and 
not all would reflect inaccurate information.  
 Out of the one hundred individuals, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) 
represented 11%. This group has gone by many names over time but during the attacks by the 
individuals in this study, it was referred to as ISIS. This may seem like a shockingly low number 
based on the great number of violent attacks broadcasted in the news. The reason that this 
number is so low is because the profile only measures attacks against the West and does not 
include attacks within the Middle East and against Middle Eastern people.  
Figure 7: Known Group Affiliations of Salafi Jihadist Activists  
 
 
 The other two groups that were represented in this study were Ansar Dine and Jaish-e-
Mohammed. The reason that more individuals did not represent these groups is because of their 
geographic location and agendas. For example, Ansar Dine is a local salafi jihadist organization 
in Mali. This group has been suspected to have ties with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) but it cannot be verified. The other group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, is located primarily in 
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Pakistan but carries out operation in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Both of these groups typically do 
not conduct operations in the West and have a more centralized conflict to their home base 
location.  
Social Networks 
 When researching social networks the following factors were considered: having a salafi 
family, having salafi friends, and having a salafi mentor. During the research it was quite 
difficult to determine whether or not an individual had family members let alone determine 
whether or not they believed in the salafi ideology as well. The factor of salafi family resulted in 
nine individuals with salafi family members, twenty individuals without family members at all or 
without salafi origins, and seventy-one individuals with unknown salafi family descent. Salafi 
family members are not a good factor for creating a profile of at risk individuals mainly because 
the data is just not available. Figure 8 shows the disparities among the factors for social 
networks.  
Figure 8: Social Networks of Salafi Jihadist Activists 
 
 The next factor that was researched is having salafi friends. The results for this indicated 
that fifty-one individuals associated closely with other salafi followers. Thirty-seven individuals 
did not have any salafi friends and twelve individuals did not have this information publically 
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available. The reason that this was somewhat easier to find is because a lot of the individuals 
worked alongside others when conducting attacks or were recruited into a salafi jihadist group 
and had associates within the group. This appears to be a good way to target recruiters and other 
at risk individuals but may not be as easy since it would be prior to the attacks and publications. 
Instead of using news articles, it may be possible to use social media to track and target these 
individuals. One would have to look for certain buzzwords using social media search engines 
and then target individuals from there. While this information is easily accessible to the public, 
this begs the question of where the boundaries for online search extend to and where regulations 
prevent privacy infringements.  
 The final factor in this category is that of having a salafi mentor. Out of the one hundred 
profiles, fifty-three individuals had a salafi mentor. Having a salafi mentor was easy to access 
because the event had already taken place and the profiles and publications had already done the 
research and had it easily accessible. For targeting or profiling purposes in the future, one way to 
determine this is to establish a set of at risk characteristics, identify at risk groups, find a 
common associate that doesn’t quite fit the group’s profile, target the friend or mentor for 
surveillance. Unfortunately is a very long process and involves a lot of profiling and guessing so 
it may not be the best option, but it is worth trying to mitigate recruitment. 
 Figure 9 shows the relationship between having both salafi friends and a salafi mentor 
and whether or not an individual was recruited. The graph shows that 67% of individuals that 
had both salafi friends and a salafi mentor were recruited. Individuals that had both factors and 
were not recruited represented 14% of the total and those with information not available 
represented 19% of the total.  
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Figure 9: Salafi Friends & Mentor vs. Recruitment  
  
VI. Conclusion & Discussion 
 During the course of my study I have come across some inaccuracies in my original 
hypotheses but also some of them have been further validated. For each of my hypotheses, I will 
discuss whether or not they were supported and what conclusions can be drawn from the results 
of my research on each variable. 
 One of the most important factors that were determined in this study was country of 
origin and ethnicity. The intent of the study was to look at individuals that originated from the 
Middle East and conducted attacks on the West but the data that was gathered also included a 
few outliers. Appendix D shows a table of the different countries of origin for the one hundred 
individuals that were studied. There were only fourteen individuals that did not have information 
available for their country of origin. There were seventeen individuals from Saudi Arabia, nine 
from the United Kingdom, seven from Egypt, five from Afghanistan, and four from Pakistan. 
Smaller numbers were represented from the following countries: United States, Lebanon, Mali, 
Palestine, Syria, Canada, Yemen, Jamaica, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Morocco, 
Jordan, Nigeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Ethiopia, France, Iran, Denmark, India, and Mauritania. It 
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was surprising to find that there were quite a few individuals from the United States but their 
families either had origins in the Middle East or they were converts.  
 In Appendix E, the table shows the different ethnicities of the one hundred individuals 
that were researched in the study. The responses were very generalized because of the limitations 
on open source data and that which was available. Out of the one hundred studied, sixty 
individuals were Arab. There were twenty-eight individuals that their ethnicity could not be 
determined based on initial search. The remaining ethnicities were represented in smaller 
numbers by the following: Asian, Chechen-Avar, Egyptian, Pashtun, Afghan American, 
Albanian, and Iraqi. The majority of these individuals studied were Arabs and this is partly 
because of the language capabilities and method of transferring the group’s messages. If the 
messages are provided in Arabic, an Arabic speaking and reading audience is most likely to be 
engaged.  
 My first hypothesis was: Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks 
against the West in the name of salafi jihadism are between the ages of 18-29. This hypothesis 
was supported by my results by was by a narrow margin. Not all individuals are between this age 
range, but 48% of the data was represented here. When combining the information gathered from 
the literature review and the data found during the research, it appears that a significant number 
of individuals are getting involved at a younger age and are starting their path earlier. While this 
is a good conclusion to draw from this data, I think that a better way to describe the ages is that 
they are starting younger but do not seem to phase out until the 50s age range. This could be 
because these individuals are incarcerated but that is not the key take away. If targeting at risk 
individuals is the goal, looking to the age range of 18-29 is going to be the best range to start at.  
 My second hypothesis was: Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror 
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attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism are male. This hypothesis was supported 
by the results of the study. Ninety-nine males were present in this research and only one female. 
While this could have been different if the information was more publically available, the current 
literature seems to indicate that males are more likely to be engaging in violent attacks of jihad 
than females.  
 My third hypothesis was: Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks 
against the West in the name of salafi jihadism have pursued higher education post high school. 
While this research appears to support this hypothesis by having 49% of the data indicate higher 
education, there were still a lot of unknown responses to consider. Twenty-six percent of the data 
was represented by unavailable information and that is cause for concern when making accurate 
conclusions. While I feel that individuals are starting to join during or after their engagement 
with higher education, more research needs to be done to determine the validity of this argument.  
 My fourth hypothesis was: Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks 
against the West in the name of salafi jihadism are self-radicalized and not influenced. This 
hypothesis was not really supported or refuted by the data from the study. It showed that forty-
four individuals were influenced while only thirty-six appeared to be self-radicalized. This result 
could have occurred because I evaluated individuals that have already conducted attacks. Most of 
the data came from affiliated individuals that work with larger terrorist organizations and not just 
on their own. Typically attacks carried about by known terrorist organizations are easier to find 
in open source media documents so they are presented more in this research. This could be the 
reason why the data indicated a slightly higher number of individuals being influenced as 
opposed to self-radicalized. In addition to this, it would be interesting to assess the number of 
individuals that are influenced in jails and prisons and see how that would have an impact on the 
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results.  
 My fifth hypothesis was: Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks 
against the West in the name of salafi jihadism have social networks that include all of the 
following: salafi family, salafi friends, salafi mentor. This hypothesis was partially refuted in that 
some of these factors played a key role but one of them did not. This is most likely due to the 
lack of information regarding the factor of Salafi family. If this information was available the 
results could have been different. The two factors of Salafi friends and Salafi mentors seemed to 
play a large role in the profile. Just over half of the data indicated the presence of Salafi friends 
and Salafi mentors among individuals that have already engaged in attacks. In addition to this, 
sixty-seven percent of the individuals that had Salafi friends and a Salafi mentor were actually 
recruited into a known terrorist organization. This appears to be a clear indication that having 
Salafi friends and mentors is a common characteristic and social network for Salafi jihadist 
followers.   
 There are several potential objections that one might raise about the research I have 
conducted and they all involve the amount of data available. The first objection that might be 
raised is whether or not conclusions can be drawn from the data when a significant amount of the 
information I collected was not available for all subjects in the study. While this is accurate, this 
is the first time this kind of database has been constructed and further research would need to be 
conducted to gather more subjects and information. In addition to this, open source data is 
limited to what it can offer for this type of personal information. Another objection that could be 
raised is whether or not these conclusions are cause for action or whether they should just add to 
the literature base. I suggest that this study exists as a launching point for further research on the 
common characteristics of salafi jihadist recruits, members, and fighters. While my study 
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consisted of those that have already engaged, it is necessary to profile those that are being 
recruited in order to intervene in the process. Intervention in this process will be necessary to cut 
off the supply to these groups.  
 It is necessary to conduct and analyze more specific research on Salafi jihadist groups 
and their individual recruiting processes in order to understand the nuances of this form of 
terrorism. These preconditions can be used to establish a profile for what potential radicals and 
recruits would be like for Salafi jihadist groups. Psychologist Anthony Stahelski understands the 
significance of establishing such a profile when he comments, “Counterterrorism efforts would 
be enhanced if likely terrorist candidates could be preemptively identified on a precise individual 
basis” (Stahelski, 2004). It is unlikely that we can identify each individual as a potential target, 
but identifying the characteristics of past radicals and recruits will allow for an intervention in 
the process when such conditions appear in a community.  
 The next step would be to analyze this data to establish a profile to look for in at risk 
communities. Once the profile is established, research needs to be conducted on the possible 
intervention methods or social programs that could be put into place to prevent such 
radicalization from occurring in the first place. 
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Appendix A 
This map shows the outreach and settlement of Al Qaeda, affiliates, and fellow Salafi jihadist 
followers across the Middle East and North Africa (The Economist, 2013). 
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Appendix B 
This figure shows the different phases of social psychological conditioning.  
 
Figure 1: The Five Phases of Social Psychological Conditioning 
Phase 1—Depluralization: stripping away all other group member 
identities 
Phase 2—Self-deindividuation: stripping away each member’s personal 
identity 
Phase 3—Other-deindividuation: stripping away the personal identities 
of enemies 
Phase 4—Dehumanization: identifying enemies as subhuman or 
nonhuman 
Phase 5—Demonization: identifying enemies as evil 
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Appendix C 
List of Islamic terror attacks against the West displayed on the website markhumphrys.com. This 
list was used as a starting point for the database created in the above study.   	  
First wave (1968 to 
1980): 
1. Many countries -
 Palestinian 
terror 1968 on. 
2. USA - RFK 
assassination196
8. 
3. Italy - El Al Flight 
426 1968. 
4. Greece - El Al 
Flight 253 1968. 
5. Switzerland - El 
Al Flight 
4321969. 
6. Germany -
 Frankfurt 1969. 
7. UK - Marks and 
Spencer 1969. 
8. Italy - TWA 
Flight 840 1969. 
9. UK - Zim 
shipping 1969. 
10. Belgium - El Al, 
Brussels 1969. 
11. Greece - El Al, 
Athens 1969. 
12. Germany -
 Munich 
airport1970. 
13. Switzerland -
 Swissair Flight 
330 1970. 
14. Various 
countries -
 Dawson's Field 
hijackings 1970. 
15. Austria - Sabena 
Flight 5711972. 
16. Germany -
 Munich 
Olympics1972. 
17. UK - Israeli 
Under Reagan (1980 to 
1988): 
1. Italy - Rome 
airport1981. 
2. Austria - Heinz 
Nittel1981. 
3. Italy - El Al 
office 1981. 
4. Greece - travel 
agency1981. 
5. Italy - Rome 
airport1981. 
6. Austria - Israeli 
embassy 1981. 
7. Austria - Vienna 
synagogue 1981. 
8. Italy -
 Ostia 1981. 
9. Belgium -
 Antwerp 
synagogue 1981. 
10. France -
 Christian 
Chapman 1981. 
11. Germany -
 Berlin 
restaurant 1982. 
12. France - Charles 
Ray1982. 
13. Italy - El Al 
office 1982. 
14. France - Israeli 
embassy1982. 
15. Austria - French 
embassy 1982. 
16. UK - Israeli 
ambassador1982
. 
17. France - Paris 
restaurant 1982. 
18. Japan - Pan Am 
Flight 830 1982. 
19. France - Israeli 
Under Bush (1988 to 
1992): 
1. Many countries -
 Salman 
Rushdie 1989 on. 
2. USA - Rushdie 
bookshops 1989. 
3. USA - Riverdale 
Press1989. 
4. Italy - Rushdie 
bookshops 1989. 
5. Belgium - Rushdie 
killings 1989. 
6. UK - Rushdie 
bookshops1989. 
7. Norway - Rushdie 
bookshops 1989. 
8. UK - Rushdie 
bookshops1989. 
9. France - Rushdie 
publisher 1989. 
10. Belgium - Joseph 
Wybran 1989. 
11. USA - Rashad 
Khalifa1990. 
12. Switzerland -
 Kazem 
Radjavi 1990. 
13. USA - Meir 
Kahane1990. 
14. Australia - Makin 
Morcos 1991. 
15. Italy - Ettore 
Capriolo1991. 
16. Japan - Hitoshi 
Igarashi1991. 
17. Hungary -
 Budapest1991. 
18. Argentina - Israeli 
embassy 1992. 
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embassy 1972. 
18. USA - letter 
bomb 1972. 
19. USA - Hamaas 
Khaalis 1973. 
20. USA - Stephen 
Gilroy 1973. 
21. USA - Yosef 
Alon 1973. 
22. Greece - El Al, 
Athens 1973. 
23. Holland - Japan 
Air Lines Flight 
404 1973. 
24. Greece - Athens 
airport 1973. 
25. Austria - train 
hostages 1973. 
26. Italy - Pan Am 
Flight 110 1973. 
27. UK - Teddy 
Sieff 1973. 
28. USA - Zebra 
killings 1973-74. 
29. UK - London 
bank 1974. 
30. Greece - TWA 
Flight 841 1974. 
31. France - Paris 
airport 1975. 
32. Austria -
 OPEC 1975. 
33. Greece - Entebbe 
hijacking1976. 
34. USA - Hanafi 
Siege 1977. 
35. Spain -
 Lufthansa Flight 
1811977. 
36. Various 
countries -
 poisoned 
oranges 1978. 
37. France - Paris 
airport 1978. 
38. UK -
 London 1978. 
39. Many countries -
 Iranian 
terror 1979 on. 
40. France - Paris 
bombs 1979. 
41. Belgium -
Embassy 1982. 
20. Belgium -
 Brussels 
synagogue 1982. 
21. Italy - Rome 
synagogue1982. 
22. USA - Daniel 
Jordan1982. 
23. Australia -
 Sydney 
bombs 1982. 
24. USA - Hotel 
Rajneesh 
bombing 1983. 
25. USA - Ahmadi 
attacks1983. 
26. France - Paris 
restaurant 1983. 
27. UK -
 London 1983. 
28. France - TGV 
bombing1983. 
29. Greece -
 Kenneth 
Whitty 1984. 
30. UK - Yvonne 
Fletcher1984. 
31. France - Marks 
and 
Spencer 1985. 
32. France - Jewish 
film 
festival 1985. 
33. Spain -
 Torrejon 1985. 
34. Greece - TWA 
Flight 8471985. 
35. Germany -
 Frankfurt 
Airport 1985. 
36. Spain -
 Madrid 1985. 
37. Denmark -
 Copenhagen 
synagogue 1985. 
38. Germany -
 Rhein-Main Air 
Base 1985. 
39. Greece - hotel 
attack1985. 
40. Italy -
 Rome 1985. 
41. Argentina -
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 Brussels 
airport1979. 
42. Austria - Vienna 
synagogue1979. 
43. Spain - Max 
Mazin 1980. 
44. UK - Mohamed 
Mustafa 
Ramadan 1980. 
45. Belgium - Yosef 
Halachi 1980. 
46. Belgium -
 Antwerp 1980. 
47. Italy - Bologna 
bombing 1980. 
48. France - Paris 
synagogue1980. 
 Jewish 
kindergarten 19
85. 
42. Greece -
 EgyptAir Flight 
648 1985. 
43. Germany -
 Frankfurt1985. 
44. France -
 Paris 1985. 
45. Italy and Austria 
- Rome and 
Vienna 1985. 
46. France - Paris 
bombings1986. 
47. France - TGV 
bombing1986. 
48. France - Paris 
bombing1986. 
49. Italy - TWA 
Flight 8401986. 
50. Germany - West 
Berlin1986. 
51. UK - BA 
office 1986. 
52. France -
 Kenneth 
Marston 1986. 
53. France - Paris 
bombings1986. 
54. Germany - U.S. 
Tempelhof Air 
Base1986. 
55. Belgium -
 Antwerp 
synagogue 1986. 
56. Switzerland - Air 
Afrique 
hijack 1987. 
57. Italy - poisoned 
grapefruit 1988. 
58. Greece - City of 
Poros1988. 
59. UK -
 Lockerbie 1988. 
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Under Clinton (1992 to 
2000): 
1. USA - CIA 
HQ 1993. 
2. USA - WTC 1993. 
3. Norway -
 William 
Nygaard1993. 
4. USA -
 Brooklyn 1994. 
5. Argentina -
 Jewish 
centre1994. 
6. UK - Israeli 
Embassy1994. 
7. France - Algerian 
terror1994-95. 
8. France - Paris 
Metro 1995. 
9. France - Jewish 
school1995. 
10. France - Paris 
train 1996. 
11. France - Paris 
metro 1996. 
12. USA - Empire 
State 
Building 1997. 
13. South Africa -
 Planet 
Hollywood 1998. 
14. USA - EgyptAir 
Flight 9901999. 
15. USA - H. Rap 
Brown2000. 
16. Germany -
 Dusseldorf 
synagogue 2000. 
17. France -
 Villepinte 
synagogue 2000. 
18. UK - Nabil 
Ouldeddine2000
. 
Under Bush (2000 to 
2008): 
1. USA - 9/11 2001. 
2. UK - Ross 
Parker2001. 
3. France - AZF 
explosion 2001. 
4. USA - shoe 
bomber2001. 
5. Holland - Pim 
Fortuyn 2002. 
6. USA - LA 2002. 
7. USA - Beltway 
sniper2002. 
8. France -
 Bertrand 
Delanoë 2002. 
9. USA - Ariel 
Sellouk2003. 
10. France -
 Sebastian 
Sellam 2003. 
11. Spain -
 Madrid 2004. 
12. Holland - Theo 
van Gogh 2004. 
13. UK -
 London 2005. 
14. France - Ilan 
Halimi2006. 
15. USA - NC SUV 
attack2006. 
16. Germany - Amir 
Cheema 2006. 
17. USA - Seattle 
Jewish 
centre 2006. 
18. USA - CA SUV 
attack2006. 
19. Norway - Oslo 
synagogue 2006. 
20. UK - London and 
Glasgow 2007. 
21. USA - Chauncey 
Bailey 2007. 
22. UK -
 Exeter 2008. 
23. UK - Sherry 
Jones2008. 
24. Denmark -
 Odense2008. 
Under Obama (2008 to 
2016): 
1. USA - Little 
Rock 2009. 
2. Italy - Milan 2009. 
3. USA - Fort 
Hood 2009. 
4. USA - Richard T. 
Antoun2009. 
5. USA - Flight 
253 2009. 
6. Denmark - Kurt 
Westergaard2010. 
7. USA - Times 
Square 2010. 
8. UK - Stephen 
Timms 2010. 
9. Sweden - Lars 
Vilks 2010. 
10. Sweden - Malmo 
synagogue2010. 
11. Denmark -
 Copenhagen 
hotel2010. 
12. Sweden - Issa 
Issa 2010. 
13. USA - military 
shootings 2010. 
14. USA/UK - cargo 
planes 2010. 
15. Sweden -
 Stockholm 2010. 
16. Italy - Nello 
Rega 2011. 
17. UK - Gary 
Smith 2011. 
18. Germany -
 Frankfurt 2011. 
19. Australia -
 Sydney 2011. 
20. Brazil - school 
shooting 2011. 
21. Norway -
 apostates 2011. 
22. Canada - Paris 
Dipersico 2011. 
23. USA - Waltham 
murders 2011. 
24. USA - Alaa 
Alsaegh 2011. 
25. Germany - J. 
Gehirn 2011. 
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26. France - Charlie 
Hebdo arson2011. 
27. Denmark - Hare 
Krishna 
temple 2011. 
28. Germany - Ferhad 
Ahma 2011. 
29. South Africa - Al-
Shabaab 
terror 2011-12. 
30. USA - Gelareh 
Bagherzadeh2012. 
31. Norway - Christian 
converts2012. 
32. Australia - Alevi 
centre 2012. 
33. France - Toulouse 
massacre2012. 
34. Bulgaria - Burgas 
bombing2012. 
35. France - Paris 2012. 
36. Cyprus - British 
soldier 2012. 
37. USA - Coty 
Beavers 2012. 
38. Denmark - Lars 
Hedegaard2013. 
39. USA - Boston 
Marathon 2013. 
40. France -
 Roussillon 2013. 
41. UK - Woolwich 
soldier 2013. 
42. France - Paris 
soldier 2013. 
43. UK - prison 
officer 2013. 
44. USA - Gay nightclub 
fire 2013. 
45. Belgium - Jewish 
Museum2014. 
46. France - Jewish 
supermarket2014. 
47. USA - Ali 
Muhammad 
Brown2014. 
48. Australia -
 Melbourne 2014. 
49. USA - Oklahoma 
beheading2014. 
50. Canada - St-Jean-
sur-Richelieu 2014. 
51. Canada - Ottawa 
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Parliament 
attack 2014. 
52. USA - New York axe 
attack2014. 
53. UK - Israel 
stall 2014. 
54. France - Jewish 
restaurant2014. 
55. Australia - Sydney 
cafe 2014. 
56. France - Joue-les-
Tours 2014. 
57. France -
 Dijon 2014. 
58. France -
 Nantes 2014. 
59. France - Charlie 
Hebdomassacre 20
15. 
60. France - Jewish 
supermarket 
massacre 2015. 
61. France - Other 
Paris 
shootings2015. 
62. Germany -
 Cartoons 
arson2015. 
63. Belgium -
 Verviers 2015. 
64. UK - Mold 2015. 
65. France - Nice 2015. 
66. Denmark -
 Copenhagen 
cafe2015. 
67. Denmark -
 Copenhagen 
synagogue 2015. 
68. South Africa -
 Zainub Priya 
Dala 2015. 
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Appendix D These	  tables	  identify	  the	  specific	  countries	  of	  origin	  of	  the	  100	  individuals	  researched	  in	  the	  study.	  	  
Country	  
Number	  
of	  People	  
	  
Country	  
Number	  of	  
People	  
N/A	   14	  
	  
Morocco	   2	  
Saudi	  Arabia	   17	   	   Iran	   2	  
United	  Kingdom	   9	  
	  
Jordan	   1	  
Egypt	   7	  
	  
Nigeria	   1	  
Afghanistan	   5	  
	  
Bosnia	   1	  
USA	   5	  
	  
Chechnya	   1	  
Pakistan	   4	  
	  
Ethiopia	   1	  
Algeria	   3	  
	  
France	   1	  
Lebanon	   3	  
	  
Denmark	   1	  
Mali	   3	  
	  
India	   1	  
Palestine	   3	  
	  
Mauritania	   1	  
Syria	   2	  
	   	   	  
Canada	   2	  
	   	   	  
Yemen	   2	  
	   	   	  
Jamaica	   2	  
	   	   	  
Kuwait	   2	  
	   	   	  United	  Arab	  
Emirates	   2	  
	   	   	  
Sudan	   2	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Appendix	  E	  	  This	  table	  represents	  the	  ethnicities	  of	  the	  100	  individuals	  researched	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
Ethnicity	  
Number	  of	  
People	  
Arab	   60	  
N/A	   28	  
Asian	   3	  
Chechen-­‐Avar	   2	  
Egyptian	   2	  
Pashtun	   2	  
Afghan	  American	   1	  
Albanian	   1	  
Iraqi	   1	  	  	  
 
